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COMES NOW, Respondent Jay P. Clark, by and through his attorney of record, Larry D. 
Purviance, and submits the following brief on appeal from the Hearing Committee of the Idaho 
State Bar, which in its Finding of Facts and Conclusions of Law recommended that Jay P. Clark 
be SUSPENDED from the Practice of Law in the State ofIdaho. For all of the Grounds and 
Reasons submitted herein, it is Respectfully Submitted that the Hearing Committee erred as a 
Matter of Law and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law should be V ACA TED and this 
matter be REMANDED for further proceedings. 
A. 
THE HEARING COMMITTEE ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT FIND THAT 
RESPONDENT/APPELLANT'S DUE PROCESS GUARENTEES WERE VIOLATED BY 
THE BAR'S UNREASONABLE DELAY IN INITIATING THE PROCEEDINGS AND 
THE HEARING COMMITTEE'S VIOLATION OF ITS OWN PROCEDURAL RULES. 
Respondent in both his Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss submitted in 
February 2010 and in his Memorandum of Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
submitted on January 20th, 2011 raised a number oflegal objections to the proceedings and 
substantive allegations, which were either given short shrift or ignored by the Bar Hearing 
Committee in its Finding of Facts and Conclusions of Law. These issues are raised again as the 
basis ofthis appeal and Respondent respectfully requests that this Court rule on the relevant 
issues as presented in Respondent's prior submissions to the Bar Hearing Committee, including 
his Motion to Dismiss and his Memorandum of Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law. 
The Respondent initially replied to the substance of the Bar's allegations found in 
Count's two, three, four, and five of the complaint on October 7,2005, which reply included 25 
(twenty five) attached documents and is part of the record in this file. No response from the Bar 
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to the Respondent was made whatsoever following the receipt of the Respondent's letter and 
documents until the formal filing of the complaint in this case dated May 20,2009. The Hearing 
on this matter was finally held in December 2 and 3, 2010, more than five years after Respondent 
made his original response. The Hearing Committee belatedly generated its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Recommendations on April 7, 2011, more than four months after the 
Hearing concluded, and more than two months after the parties submitted their Memorandum of 
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Idaho Rules for Review of Professional 
Conduct 509(d)(6) states in relevant part as follows: 
(6) Time for Rendering Decision. The Hearing Committee shall render its decision within 21 
Davs following the date upon which the record is submitted to the Hearing Committee or the date 
of the telephonic hearing (if any), whichever is later. (Emphasis added) 
The Hearing Committee took two months beyond what the mandatory language of the Bar 
Commission Rules' Mandatory language sets the deadlines for rendering its recommendations. 
Approximately two years after Respondent believed he fully responded to the allegations made 
by the Bar, Respondent discontinued his office practice. Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Dismiss, P. 2, Paragraph 15 of Erin Rembert's Affidavit ATTACHED). The Bar has not 
provided any explanation for the approximately five-year delay in holding the Hearing on this 
matter, nor has the Bar explained why the Hearing Committee so egregiously violated the 
Mandatory language of the Bar Commission Rules requiring the submission of the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law within a Mandatory Period of Time. 
This issue is all the more troubling because the gravamen of the issues before the Hearing 
Committee was that Respondent Jay P. Clark failed to file the allegedly-requested Blood Alcohol 
Proceeding within the seven-day time limit set by statute. To restate the issue: An attorney who 
does not act within a very short time limit, arguably the shortest time limit in Idaho Criminal 
Law (7 days), and file a blatantly frivolous ancillary Civil Proceeding at the demand of his client, 
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and without an opportunity to adequately review discovery or consult with his client may find 
himself in a Bar Disciplinary Hearing more than five years after the original grievance is filed, 
and will finally be given the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law a matter of MONTHS 
after the clear mandatory time limits of the rules require the filing of such. 
All Attorneys are entitled to fair notice of charges and the opportunity to be heard in a 
timely fashion since the license to practice law is a constitutionally-protected interest. Matter of 
Kenney, 399 Mass. 431, 435, 504 N.E. 2d 652 (1987). The Idaho Supreme Court also cited 
United Staes V Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (1977), when faced with the same issue in Idaho State 
Bar v. Everard, Docket No. 30978 (2005), by stating that "delay in instituting criminal 
prosecution does not violate Due Process unless the Prosecutor delayed bringing the charges in a 
deliberate attempt to gain an unfair tactical advantage over the Defendant or in reckless disregard 
of its probable prejudicial impact upon the Defendant's ability to defend against the charges)." 
Id. At 10. 
This Court should hold the Idaho State Bar and the Hearing Committee to the same 
standard it held Jay Clark. Mandatory time limits mean what they say and say what they mean. 
And five years after the grievance was filed, the Hearing was finally held. 
B. 
COUNT TWO OF THE COMPLAINT WOULD HAVE REQUIRED RESPONDENT TO 
PURSUE A CLAIM WITHOUT MERIT IN EITHER LAW OR FACT 
The Bar found that Jay P. Clark violated his ethic duties to his client, Mateo Varela, by 
failing to timely file a request for a hearing to the Elmore County Magistrate Court no later than 
Monday, June 6, 2005, which was about five days after Jay Clark was retained as attorney. Jay P. 
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Clark requests a thorough review of Mateo Varela's testimony before the Bar Hearing 
Committee because it clearly demonstrates that complying with his request would have required 
that Jay P. Clark to file a blatantly frivolous civil proceeding, with little, if any time to review the 
facts and discovery supplied by the Prosecutor only late on Friday afternoon, June 3, 2005, just 
two days after the attorney/client relationship was entered into. Rule 3.1 in relevant part reads as 
follows: 
A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, 
unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a 
good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law. A lawyer for 
the defendant in a criminal proceeding, or the respondent in a proceeding that could result 
in incarceration, may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to require that every 
element of the case be established. (Idaho Rules of Conduct, Rule 3.1). 
There is no dispute here that a Request for a BAC Hearing is a civil proceeding, which is 
governed by the first sentence of the rule, and not the apparently relaxed standard of the second 
sentence, which governs the underlying criminal proceeding. Here, to file the BAC Hearing 
request would have required Jay P. Clark to file a facially frivolous Civil Proceeding, and he 
testified clearly as such. None of the Bar's witnesses disputed this important point. Both Mr. 
Varela's testimony and the Affidavit of Probable Cause for Arrest that are part ofthe record, on 
their face establish conclusively that there was more than adequate Probable Cause for his arrest. 
Since attacking the Probable Cause and/or Reasonable Suspicion for arrest is the sine qua non of 
contesting a Refusal Suspension, filing such a request would have clearly violated Rule 3.1 
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C. 
COUNT FOUR SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED SINCE THE RESPONDENT DID 
COMMUNCIATE HIS BASIS OF FEE VIA CONTEMPORANEOUS BILLING 
STATEMENTS WHICH WERE PROVIDED TO THE BAR FIVE YEARS BEFORE 
THE HEARING, AND THE HEARING COMMITTEE'S REFUSAL TO DO SO WAS 
CLEAR ERROR. 
A brief reading of Mr.Varela's testimony establishes that Mr. Clark did in fact 
communicate the basis or rate of his fee and Mr. Clark's contemporaneous billing statements 
were provided to the Bar more than five years before the Hearing. Since there was no dispute 
that Mr. Clark charged a flat fee of $500 for the DUI Defense and the BAC Hearing if filed, and 
Mr. Varela testified that he understood this contract, the Hearing Committee's findings were 
clearly erroneous and must be reversed. 
D. 
THE HEARING COMMITTEE'S FINDINGS OF FACT ON COUNT FOUR 
MUST ALSO BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE BAR'S ALLEGATION THAT THE 
RESPONDENT FAILED TO RETURN THE UNEARNED FEE IS FALSE. 
Jay P. Clark made a direct and timely attempt to return Mr. Varela's unearned fee which 
was documented in the Idaho State Bar's letter to Mr. Varela, dated September 2, 2005. 
Additionally Jay P. Clark sent a check to the Idaho State Bar a check for $218.75 made to Mateo 
Varela to be forwarded to him by Bar Counsel. Additionally, the testimony of Mr. Mitch 
Egusquiza was eloquent and insistent on one point: the going rate for a DUI Defense and BAC 
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Hearing in Elmore County at the time this incident took place was $800, the amount Mr. 
Eguisquiza charged Mr. Varela to finish this case, minus the Notice of Appearance and Request 
for Discovery that was essentially donated by Mr. Clark. The Hearing Committee's finding that 
Mr. Clark engaged in professional misconduct is clear error and refuted by the testimony of Mr. 
Egusquiza. 
E. 
THE HEARING COMMITTEE VIOLATED MR. CLARK'S FIRST AMENDMENT 
RIGHT TO DEFEND HIMSELF WHEN IT FOUND THAT THE AFFIDAVIT HE 
PREPARED FOR MR. VARELA VIOLATED THE RULES IN COUNT FIVE. 
There is no dispute that Mr. Clark never sent the Affidavit to Mr. Varela. Mr. Clark sent 
the Affidavit to Bar Counsel. If the Hearing Committee's Recommendations were to be adopted 
by this Court, attorneys would be completely unable to defend themselves from false statements 
made by clients or former clients. Given that an attorney's reputation, especially in the small 
towns of rural Idaho, can be destroyed with just one false, but highly inflammatory remark, the 
thought of attorneys having no legal recourse for any such event is untenable. 
The Conclusions of the Hearing Committee also runs afoul of certain Constitutional 
guarantees of the First Amendment by asserting that sending a demand type letter to a former 
client made in the context of settlement in lieu of litigation is an ethical violation. In Sosa v. 
DirectTV, Inc. 437 F. 3d 923 (9th Circuit 2006), the Court held that legal action could not be 
taken against DIRECT TV even though the facts it had asserted in its demand letter were entirely 
false, which involved wrongly accusing a multitude of customers of theft of its services. The 
Court held that any interference with access to the courts would be the far greater evil. 
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We conclude that restrictions on presuit demand letters may therefore raise substantial Petition 
Clause issues if, on exaqimination, such restrictions could impair the right of access to the courts 
protected by the First Amendment Id At 1691, 1692. 
The Hearing Committee's proposed Conclusions of Law suggest that an attorney in Idaho 
must give up the most fundamental of Constitutional Rights as a condition of possessing a 
license to practice law. Since the evidence is undisputed that there was no evidence or rationale 
to support the allegation that the offering of the proposed affidavit to Bar counsel is conduct that 
was prejudicial to the administration of justice, and since the allegation seriously intereferes with 
a fundamental Constitutional Right, the findings of the Hearing Committee are clearly erroneous 
and in violation of Jay P. Clark's rights under the First Amendment of the Constitution. 
F. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Respondent Jay P. Clark respectfully submits that the Hearing 
Committees findings are in violation of its own rules, contrary to the evidence and in violation of 
Respondent's rights under both the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and the 
Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore the findings of the Hearing 
Committee must be vacated and this case Remanded for Further Proceedings. 
Dated this 14th Day of November, 2011 
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LA YD. URVIANCE 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I_~REBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served as follows 
on the -t:L'0fNovember, 2011, to the following: 
By First class mail: BRAD ANDREWS 
Office of Bar Counsel 
525 Westlefferson 
PO BOX 895 
BOISE, Idaho 83701 
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